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The tragedy of September 11th has had a significant impact on the 
functions of American government and society.  University operations are clearly 
being changed by legislation that was either passed or enforced after that date.  
Historically, the university has been loath to tolerate external regulations, 
particularly those suppressing freedom of interactions among faculty and 
students.  New legislation not only affects our research and teaching, it carries 
requirements for implementation without necessarily providing the resources to 
accomplish the government’s mandates.  This circumstance occurs at a time 
when many public universities are experiencing significant cuts in financial 
support from their state legislatures. Nevertheless, the resolve of the government 
to implement new rules and regulations as soon as possible ensures that 
compliance will not be optional!  Furthermore, the war against terrorism will not 
be short lived.  Consequently, universities will have to develop strategies to cope 
with these new costs.  We must determine the costs of new security mandates 
and biomaterials regulations and then acquire the additional funding necessary to 
implement them.   
 
Rules, Regulations and Guidelines 
 
 In the state of Iowa, new regulations were initially specified by the National 
Guard in collaboration with and based on the guidelines of the Center for 
Disease Control (CDC) for use of select agents and the security required in the 
laboratories investigating them.  The lists to be used nationally will soon be 
announced by the Department of Homeland Security (DHHS) and will 
undoubtedly reflect the well-recognized categories and guidelines established by 
the CDC.  Most relevant to the research universities are the high security lists 
based on the CDC’s B list and the maximum-security list encompassing most of 
the agents on the CDC A list.  Both lists contain agents commonly employed in 
research laboratories across the country.  Tetrodotoxin, certain viral pathogens, 
and E. coli are among the frequently used items on the B list.  The A list includes 
anthrax, botulinum toxin, and Ebola virus. Of critical importance to this discussion 
is the spectrum of security required for laboratories using these agents.  Based 
on the guidelines specified by the National Guard for use at Iowa State 
University, laboratories using agents on the B list must have these security 
requirements:  card or key controlled access, electronic building access, batter-
proof doors and windows, and motion detectors in research areas.  The 
requirements for laboratories using agents in the maximum-security list (the A 
list) are even more stringent.  In addition to the requirements for securing 
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laboratories using items on the high security list, a perimeter fence or 
comparable structure is required.  A 24-hour guard or doubly secured facility that 
would include a monitored camera system is also necessary.   
 
 The costs for generating these changes are significant.  In preliminary 
estimates at our university, securing a corridor of laboratories with a key card 
system and camera exceeds $130,000.  This excludes any modifications to the 
doors or windows themselves.  The cost for personnel to monitor a facility using 
agents on the maximum-security list would exceed $150,000 per year.  This does 
not include the cost of any perimeter fencing, which undoubtedly would be 
extremely expensive, particularly if aesthetics were considered in the design. 
 
 In addition to physical facilities, the new DHHS regulations include a 
requirement to monitor and control all personnel involved in the research with 
any of the select agents.  This will require methods for obtaining background 
checks and a plan for educating our personnel.  Estimated personnel costs for 
managing and implementing this system, excluding the educational component, 
approximates $100,000, although the exact amount will depend upon the 
extensiveness of the background checks required by the new mandates. 
 
 Other rules and regulations have significant implications for traditional 
interactions that occur in research laboratories across our universities.  One of 
the most notable is the so-called “deemed export rule.”  Based on both ITAR 
(International Traffic in Arms Regulations) and EAR (Export Administration 
Regulations), any release of information to foreign nationals from specific 
countries requires an export license.  This includes release of information not 
only through formal mechanisms such as presentations and publications but also 
through casual interactions such as telephone conversations, discussions in the 
laboratory, laboratory tours, etc.  Since half of the graduate students at Iowa 
State University are from foreign countries, the new rule could pose problems 
especially in those areas of research focused on software development, 
communication hardware, and certain areas of electronics.  Because these 
regulations are intended primarily for investigations producing classified data for 
federal agencies or research in which there are mandated restrictions on 
publications, only a limited portion of research on most campuses will be 
affected.  A useful guideline in determining the applicability of the deemed export 
rule is whether or not the data resulting from the study will be publicly 
disseminated.  If so, the deemed export rule would not apply. 
 
Funding Opportunities 
 
 We must also recognize that many funding opportunities are now available 
because of the shift in research priorities toward disciplines that are critical to 
homeland security.  This trend embraces a variety of topics that are well suited to 
the mission of a land-grant university.  Iowa State University has responded by 
forming a committee (a marvelous university tradition!) to evaluate requests for 
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proposals and other announced funding opportunities that are optimally suited for 
research by collaborative teams at our institution.  This strategy should ensure 
that campus resources are focused on initiatives that are well received by our 
faculty and appropriate to their areas of expertise. In addition, our approach 
enhances the formation of effective collaborative teams – an important factor for 
competing optimally for these awards.  Our campus has also refocused attention 
and resources on existing areas of expertise that fit well with the funding priorities 
that have evolved since September 11th.  Our strengths include: an information 
assurance program, applications that combine quantitative expertise in 
engineering and agriculture, applications involving the Virtual Reality Applications 
Center, as well as activities in the Center of Scientific Forensics sponsored by 
the Department of Energy.  Interest in homeland security has stimulated a 
number of programs in both the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the 
National Science Foundation (NSF) to consider applications in these areas.  Very 
recently the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) 
announced a large program supporting research “leading to the prevention, 
detection, diagnosis, and treatment of diseases caused by agents with the 
potential to be used for the purpose of bioterrorism.”  Some funds for 
infrastructure are intermittently available from the Technology Support Working 
Group, which identifies, prioritizes, and coordinates interagency and international 
research and development requirements for combating terrorism.   NIH continues 
to award matching grants for animal facilities.  Finally, some private foundations 
such as the MacArthur Foundation provide some funds for proposals focused on 
antiterrorism research.   
 
 In conclusion, it is already very apparent that the aftermath of September 
11th will have a significant impact on the research environment in major research 
universities, particularly those with a strong land grant heritage.  Some of the 
changes will reduce openness with regard to our physical facilities as well as 
personal interchange and contact.  Our universities will meet this challenge just 
as we have met several others.  Collectively, we must make every effort to 
ensure that the government provides funds that enable us to comply without 
negatively impacting current programs on our campuses.  We must also 
minimize the intrusion of rules, such as the deemed export rule and those related 
to personnel and student screening.  To accomplish this, universities should 
develop campus strategies that minimize the impact of regulations without 
decreasing compliance.  We should also prepare our faculty for the evolution in 
funding priorities at the federal level.  If developed correctly, new initiatives could 
have very positive, long-term consequences for the research programs on our 
campuses.  Furthermore, some federal funding will be particularly conducive to 
multiple institutional awards.  This opportunity may provide a valuable framework 
for enhancing collaborations between our universities in the heartland of the 
United States. 
